VERBAL ADJECTIVES IN SOPHOCLES: NECESSITY AND MORALITY

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IN HIS RECENT BOOK, *Shame and Necessity,* B. Williams identifies the verbal adjective ending in -τέος, -τέα, -τέον as "a frequent form of speech with Sophocles' heroes." This "impersonal expression of necessity," he says, is "just one of the ways in which these characters express insistence, refusal, defiance, and other intransigent attitudes, which often evoke from others, equally, expressions of necessity."[1] Williams quotes *Ajax* 690, ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶμ' ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι πορευτέον ("Now I am going where my way must go," tr. J. Moore) and *Trachiniae* 1204, ὁποῖα δραστέ' ἐστίν ("What has to be done")—Heracles' response to Hyllus' anguished οἴμοι πάτερ, τί εἶπας; οἷά μ' εἴργασαι (". . . father, what did you say? What are you doing to me?" [1203]). He also cites Oedipus' ἀρκτέον and ἀκουστέον (*OT* 628 and 1170), "I must rule" and "I must hear," and comments, "There are many other examples."[2]

Some of these were noted thirty years ago by B. Knox in *The Heroic Temper.*[3] Knox grouped "[t]he use of the verbal adjective" with that "of the future tenses" and "above all of the tone which brooks no argument" as "characteristic of the [Sophoclean] hero's resolve to act."[4] He quoted not only *Ajax* 690 but also *Ajax* 470–72, πεῖρά τις ζητητέα / τοιάδ' ἀφ' ἧς γέροντι δηλώσω πατρὶ / μή τοι φύσιν γ' ἄσπλαγχνος ἐκ κείνου γεγώς ("Some enterprise must be sought which will show my aged father I am no cowardly son") and *Ajax* 853, ἀλλ' ἀρκτέον τὸ πρᾶγμα σὺν τάχει τινί ("I must begin the work, and fast"), as well as *OT* 628 and 1170 and *Electra* 1019–20, ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρί μοι μόνῃ τε δραστέον / τοὔργον τόδ' ("I must do this deed alone and with my own hand").

Knox did no more than note the heroes' use of the verbal adjective, but Williams makes this same observation the point of departure for an analysis of the kind of necessity they are expressing through this construction. He argues convincingly that it is not a matter of a Kantian categorical imperative, involving "the 'must' of duty," nor of Kant's "hypothetical imperative,

1. B. Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford, 1993), 75.
2. Williams, *Shame,* p. 193, n. 7.
3. B. M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964).
4. Knox, *Temper,* 10.

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involving a 'must' that is relative merely to what the agent wants to do, as when one says, 'I must go now.'" Rather, Williams shows, the use of the verbal adjective implies a sense of shame before an "internalized other" who is "conceived as one whose reaction [the hero] would respect" and who, "equally, . . . is conceived as someone who would respect those same reactions if they were appropriately directed to him. . . ." The internalized other, Williams argues, "can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter in my relations to the world about me" (p. 84). Ajax, Williams says, "is identified with the standards of excellence represented by his father's honors. And so he concludes: ἀλλ' ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι / τὸν εὐγενῆ χρή ["The noble man should either live finely or die finely"]. He has no way of living that [his father or] anyone he respects would respect—which means that he cannot live with any self-respect. That is what he meant when he said πορευτέον, that he had to go" (p. 85). Elsewhere Williams remarks, "The necessity . . . that Ajax recognized was grounded in his own identity, his sense of himself, as someone who can live in some social circumstances and not others, and what mediated between himself and the world was his sense of shame" (p. 101).

Williams' explication of the necessity expressed by the verbal adjective πορευτέον is convincing in its own right and as part of his larger discussion of "the ethical work that shame did in the ancient world," of "the ethical psychology . . . of the archaic Greeks" and "the similarities between the ways in which shame worked for the Greeks and the ways it works for us, today" (p. 102). His comment, however, that the verbal adjective is "a frequent form of speech with Sophocles' heroes," like Knox's statement that "the use of the verbal adjective expresses the heroes' resolve to act," is true only as far as it goes. For of the thirty-five verbal adjectives in the Sophoclean corpus, the plays' heroes speak only eleven. Twenty-four, on the other hand, are spoken by characters who do not have the intransigent, heroic identity of Ajax, Oedipus, Heracles, or Electra: fifteen by the "villains" (Menelaus and Agamemnon in *Ajax,* Creon in *Antigone,* Odysseus in *Philoctetes,* Creon in *Oedipus Coloneus*) and by such morally weak or ambiguous figures as Chrysothemis, the Paedagogus, and Orestes in *Electra,* Neoptolemus in *Philoctetes,* and Polynices in *Oedipus Coloneus;* the other nine by ethically "neutral" figures, including Tecmessa in *Ajax,* the Guard and Teiresias in *Antigone,* Deianeira in *Trachiniae,* Teiresias and Creon in *Oedipus Tyrannus,* and Theseus in *Oedipus Coloneus*. The use of the verbal adjective by such non-heroes suggests that its moral significance in Sophocles is more complicated than one would know from Knox and Williams. In this paper I shall first briefly survey Sophocles' use of verbal adjectives. Then I shall discuss their dramatic and moral significance, with special emphasis on *Ajax, Electra,* and *Philoctetes*. I hope to show how consideration of verbal adjectives leads one into the central ethical themes and problems of the plays.[5]

5. There is little specialized scholarship on verbal adjectives outside of the standard works on Greek grammar and syntax. The three part study by C. E. Bishop, "The Greek Verbal in -TEO," *AJP* 20 (1899):

In Greek authors through the fifth century, the verbal adjective usually resembles ἀνάγκη and related words and the impersonal δεῖ in tending to refer to or suggest some external, objective constraint or force—including "causal necessity" or "divine inevitability"—by which something "is necessary."[6] By contrast, χρή and related words normally refer to subjective, "internally based" needs, requirements, and constraints.[7] This distinction begins to break down toward the end of the fifth century, when the process begins by which "δεῖ ultimately ousted χρή from the spoken language. . . ."[8] The verbal adjective is also used to specify a practical or immediate need or requirement, if something is to be accomplished. Sometimes it conveys this "practical necessity" at the same time as it suggests an external, objective constraint or compulsion.[9]

The verbal adjective really *is* a distinctive feature of Sophoclean style. Though rare enough to be noticeable, the thirty-five instances in the seven plays stand in contrast to only five occurrences in the seven surviving plays of Aeschylus and fifty-eight in the eighteen extant plays of Euripides.[10] Like other Sophoclean stylistic features, such as resolution and ἀντιλαβή, verbal adjectives are not evenly distributed among or within the plays.[11] For example, there are eight verbal adjectives in *Ajax,* seven in *Antigone,* and six in *Oedipus Tyrannus,* but only two in *Trachiniae* and four each in *Electra, Philoctetes,* and *Oedipus Coloneus.* Occasionally, for reasons of characterization or thematic emphasis, two verbal adjectives are found close together in a particular scene, sometimes along with increased resolution and ἀντιλαβή, reflecting dramatic urgency or intensity, characterizing speakers, or calling attention to particular words, ideas, and values.

1–21, 121–38, 241–53, is vitiated by inaccurate statistical data and other misstatements, and its scattered conclusions are highly impressionistic. J. H. T. Main, "Verbals in -τέος, -τέον," *TAPA* 26 (1895): xvii–xviii (Proceedings for July, 1895, no. 7), seems to be based on more accurate data and is interpretatively suggestive. It is, however, only a brief summary of "a preliminary report of a study of the verbals in -τέος, -τέον, with particular reference to the Greek tragic poets" (p. xvii). As far as I know, Main never published a fuller account of this study. A. C. Moorhouse, *The Syntax of Sophocles* (Leiden, 1982), 171–72, discusses briefly the personal and impersonal uses of the verbal adjective, and the frequency with which it takes an object or is used absolutely, but his data seem incomplete and at times he follows Bishop uncritically.

6. ἀναγκάζων in *OC* 979 is an interesting exception to the general use of ἀνάγκη and its cognates to express objective necessity without any moral connotation.

7. Williams, *Shame,* p. 184, n. 57.

8. W. S. Barrett, *Euripides, "Hippolytos"* (Oxford, 1964), 164–65 on v. 41. Cf. G. Redard, *Recherches sur χρή, χρῆσθαι· Étude sémantique* (Paris, 1953); S. Benardete, "XPH and ΔEI in Plato and Others," *Glotta* 43 (1965): 285–98.

9. Main "Verbals," xvii, asserts (but does not demonstrate or argue in detail) that "[t]he verbal denotes 'necessity,' but preeminently necessity of an unqualified type; a necessity that is not relative, but one from which there is no appeal. As compared with δεῖ and χρή plus the infinitive, it is clearly more distinct and peremptory, and has an individuality that is much more marked. It may imply moral or logical necessity; it may indicate the necessity of expediency; it may denote the resignation of despair. It is a favorite construction in passionate appeal, order, threat, or warning." (Cf. below, p. 306, on the "passionate" use of the verbal adjective in Plato.)

10. The thirty-five Sophoclean instances are listed in the Appendix to this essay. The Aeschylean examples occur in *Sept.* 499, 600; *Ag.* 847; *Cho.* 298; *PV* 523—if *PV* is by Aeschylus. For Euripidean instances, cf. *Cyc.* 472, 561; *Alc.* 739; *Med.* 791, 1051; *Heracl.* 259, 730, 975; *Hipp.* 114, 379, 491, 1182; *Andr.* 63; *Hec.* 394; *Supp.* 291, 572; *El.* 262, 491; *HF.* 173, 294, 711, 1221, 1251, 1357, 1385 bis; *IT* 105, 111, 118, 121, 468, 620; *Ion* 373, 436, 1260, 1387 bis; *Hel.* 268, 499, 860, 1387 (905 is interpolated); *Phoen.* 265, 395, 712, 1210, 1279; *Or.* 484, 769, 786; *Bacch.* 324, 366, 953, 1256; *IA* 734, 902, 1010, 1016, 1024. In addition, there are two verbal adjectives in the doubtfully Euripidean *Rhesus* (584, 690). All these lines are iambic trimeters except *Or.* 769, 786 and *IA* 902.

11. Cf. H. D. F. Kitto, "Sophocles, Statistics and the *Trachiniae*," *AJP* 40 (1939): 178–93.

For example, of the eight instances of the verbal adjective in *Ajax,* ll. 470, 668, 679, 690, and 853 are spoken by the hero, 809 by Tecmessa, 1140 by Menelaus, and 1250 by Agamemnon. Three of Ajax's verbal adjectives occur within twenty-three lines (668, 679, 690) in his great speech of deception, and one near the end of his long, final speech (853). These four lines, addressed to himself in his two last speeches before his suicide, help to characterize him definitively in his own eyes, just as l. 470 does in the estimation of Tecmessa and the Chorus and as all five lines do in the eyes of an audience or reader.

Similarly, of the seven verbal adjectives in *Antigone,* two occur in consecutive lines of the Guard's speech reporting the first ritual burial of Polynices' corpse; they express the burden of necessity that, he says, he and his fellow Guards felt to inform Creon of what had happened. Five other verbal adjectives are spoken by Creon (310, 524, 677, 678, 1106): two of these occur in successive lines of his initial address to Haemon and express strongly his characteristic obsessions with defending τοῖς κοσμουμένοις and with not being worsted by a woman; one is part of his equally characteristic assumption that the Guard was bribed; one occurs at the end of his intense stichomythia with Antigone in the second episode, in a sentence that angrily mocks her οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν ("I was not born to share in [my brothers'] hatred but in their solidarity," 523), and also asserts his gratuitous refusal to be ruled by a woman; and one occurs as his will breaks under the threats of Teiresias and he dispiritedly realizes that "one must not fight with necessity" (ἀνάγκῃ δ' οὐχὶ δυσμαχητέον, 1106).

Two of the six instances in *Oedipus Tyrannus* occur close together in the mouth of Creon at 1439 and 1443, in similar statements affirming his desire to learn fully from the oracle "what must be done" with Oedipus (ἐκμαθεῖν τί πρακτέον, 1439; ἐκμαθεῖν τί δραστέον, 1443). These statements reflect Creon's characteristic prudence as opposed to Oedipus' pattern of acting first and learning fully only when it is too late.

Finally, two of the four verbal adjectives in *Philoctetes,* ἡ δ' ὁδὸς πορευτέα and πειστέον τάδε, are spoken by Odysseus in consecutive lines of the third Episode (993, 994). (The second of these lines also is marked by ἀντιλαβή, when Odysseus is insisting that Philoctetes must go to Troy in accordance with the decision of Zeus.) The other two verbal adjectives in the play also occur relatively close together, in the Prologue. The first appears in Odysseus' instruction to Neoptolemus not to lie about his identity (τόδ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον, 57) while he "steal[s] the life of Philoctetes with words" (τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ / ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων, 54–55). The second occurs when Neoptolemus breaks under Odysseus' seduction, after hearing that he himself can't sack Troy without the weapons of Philoctetes or they without him: θηρατέ' οὖν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἴπερ ὧδ' ἔχει ("They [sc. the weapons] would have to be hunted, if this is so," 116). This is apparently the only instance in any classical Greek author with γίγνομαι rather than εἰμί as the copula with the verbal adjective, and the only example in Sophocles of the verbal adjective with an optative form of the copula.

Because verbal adjectives are so rare, they have a special force wherever they occur, and especially when they are found in combination with other

stylistic and metrical features that similarly call special attention to themselves and so emphasize particular words or phrases. For instance, in *Ajax* 690, ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶμ' ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι πορευτέον, and *Electra* 1019, ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρί μοι μόνῃ τε δραστέον, the iambic trimeter is bisected by a polysyllabic word ending at position 6, though in *Ajax* 690 the bisection is perhaps mitigated by elision and in *Electra* 1019 by apparent word-end at the normal caesural position 5 just before the enclitic μοι. In *Electra* 1019, the metrical word-shape of αὐτόχειρί μοι, –⏑–⏑–, is unparalleled in Sophocles at position 6; even that of αὐτόχειρι alone, –⏑–⏑ (if one does not consider the enclitic to be part of the word), is relatively rare at position 5 both in the play and in Sophocles' poetry generally.[12] That of μόνῃ τε, ⏑–⏑, at position 9 is equally unusual.[13] These features make *Electra* 1019 as striking metrically as in the thought it expresses—that Electra alone will act with her own hand (to avenge her father by murdering Aegisthus); the effect is perhaps enhanced by the enjambments in ll. 1017 and 1019 and the rare elision at the end of 1017 (a distinctively Sophoclean stylistic feature, not found in Aeschylus or Euripides; cf. Jebb on *OT* 29). *Ajax* 690 is not quite as unusual metrically as *Electra* 1019, though the word-shape of ἐκεῖσ', ⏑–, occurs at position 6 in only 1 or 2% of Sophocles' trimeters, and the sequence of successive iambic-shaped words, ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι, in positions 7–10, is even rarer. The future force of εἶμ(ι) together with the verbal adjective πορευτέον characterizes Ajax as deciding for himself his own necessary destiny and, along with these metrical features, give the line the special force that, perhaps, drew Williams' attention to it and made it the point of departure for his discussion of "shame and autonomy."

As I have suggested, Williams' and Knox's association of verbal adjectives with the Sophoclean heroes is only part of the story. This construction may express a moral imperative basic to the character of Ajax, Electra, or Oedipus (the heroes of the three Sophoclean plays that were most popular in late ancient and Byzantine times, precisely, perhaps, because of the clarity of their heroes' moral character). Nevertheless, its use may equally well characterize the hypocritical Agamemnon and Menelaus, the time-serving Chrysothemis, or the hubristic Creon of *Oedipus Coloneus*. In these cases, as in those of the Paedagogus and Orestes in *Electra,* of Creon in *Antigone,* and of Teiresias and Creon in *Oedipus Tyrannus,* neither the nature of the necessity expressed by the verbal adjective nor its source is immediately obvious—though clearly neither the nature nor the source is "moral" in any obvious way. When, for example, Menelaus says to Teucer, ἓν σοι φράσω· τόνδ' ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον ("I'll tell you one thing: this man must not be buried," *Ajax* 1140), his "must" is a product and expression of political expediency and self-assertion (cf. 1050); it lacks moral authority and cogency, especially in contrast to Ajax's five earlier uses of the verbal adjective. Menelaus implies a moral or natural "necessity," when in fact he has only his military/political rank (and his brother) to back him up.

12. S. L. Schein, *The Iambic Trimeter in Aeschylus and Sophocles: A Study in Metrical Form* (Leiden, 1979), 69, table XIII.

13. Schein, *Trimeter,* 73, table XXI.

Similarly, when Agamemnon scornfully tells Teucer that social stability and order are threatened by his opposition to himself and the army (1239–49), and that "this [threat] must be prevented, for wide-shouldered, / broad-backed men are not the most reliable, / but sensible men rightly dominate everywhere" (ἀλλ' εἰρκτέον τάδ' ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ πλατεῖς / οὐδ' εὐρύνωτοι φῶτες ἀσφαλέστατοι / ἀλλ' οἱ φρονοῦντες εὖ κρατοῦσι πανταχοῦ, 1250–52)—when Agamemnon says this, the "necessity" expressed by the word εἰρκτέον is grounded only in the king's class consciousness and personal vanity, not in anything objectively moral or necessary. This effect is enhanced by the vaguely worded, general claim in 1246–49 that "there would never be any established law, / if we will push out the ones justly conquering / and bring forward those from behind" (οὐκ ἄν ποτε / κατάστασις γένοιτ' ἂν οὐδενὸς νόμου, / εἰ τοὺς δίκῃ νικῶντας ἐξωθήσομεν / καὶ τοὺς ὄπισθεν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν ἄξομεν).

This matter of objectivity is important. Menelaus and Agamemnon actually speak on the basis of subjective, selfishly political "needs" but, as it were, veil these "needs" in the general language of objective necessity—language that is meant to be rhetorically effective but also is psychologically revealing. They compete with Teucer, rhetorically, for control of Ajax's corpse: Menelaus' verbal adjective, τόνδ' ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον (1140), against Teucer's emphatic futures: λυπήσομεν (1139), τεθάψεται (1141), πημανούμενος (1155); Agamemnon's ἀλλ' εἰρκτέον τάδ' ἐστίν against Teucer's βουλήσῃ ποτὲ / καὶ δειλὸς εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ 'ν ἐμοὶ θρασύς (1314–15), where once again two modes of expression characteristic of "the heroic temper"—the verbal adjective and the future indicative—are opposed to one another. Teucer wins out through the intervention of Odysseus. It is in accordance with the common humanity and moral flexibility that governs the conclusion of the play that neither of these two characters uses a verbal adjective, either with the existential integrity and grandeur of Ajax or with the self-serving pomposity and evasiveness of Menelaus and Agamemnon.

The verbal adjectives spoken by Ajax and those spoken by Menelaus and Agamemnon have relatively obvious and straightforward contrasting effects. In other plays, however, there is not always so simple and clear-cut a division between good and bad characters. Then the basis of the necessity suggested by the verbal adjective is less evident, and its range of moral signification is correspondingly greater and more complex.

In *Electra,* for example, the Paedagogus, Chrysothemis, Electra, and Orestes use the construction once each, and each seems to have a different reason for his or her use (though the Paedagogus and Orestes are, so to speak, on the same wavelength). When the Paedagogus tells Orestes and Pylades (15–16), "Now . . . we must quickly plan what we need to do" (νῦν οὖν . . . τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἐν τάχει βουλευτέον), he does so having also just told them that he rescued and reared Orestes to be the avenger for his father of his slaughter (11–14). This vengeance (and the immediate, practical need to avoid being seen, 17–22) are the basis of the necessity in βουλευτέον, the reason why planning is required. Here there is neither "divine inevitability" nor any "causal necessity" other than the subjective need, signaled by χρή (in l. 16), for action, the rightness of which is marked as objectively given

and valid by the verbal adjective. This is how the Paedagogus sees it. It is no accident that Orestes replies to him in a sophistically colored speech, the keynote of which is opportunism (καιρός: 31, 39, 75, picking up ἔργων ἀκμή, 22), and that he emphasizes gaining advantage through trickery and stealth (δόλοισι κλέψαι, 37), deception (λόγῳ κλέπτοντες, 56), and a false oath (ὅρκον προστιθείς, 47). Although Orestes says (69–70) that he "comes in justice / as a cleanser [of the house] inspired by the gods" (ἔρχομαι / δίκῃ καθαρτὴς πρὸς θεῶν ὡρμημένος), the only sign of this anywhere in the speech is Orestes' own, perhaps tendentious report of Apollo's description of his stealthy vengeance as "slaughter with a righteous hand" (χειρὸς ἐνδίκου σφαγάς, 37).[14] He gives this report in his account of his instrumental inquiry at Delphi as to how, rather than whether, he should take vengeance on his father's murderers, and of the oracle's equally instrumental reply to do so treacherously (32–37). Taken together, the opening speeches of the Paedagogus and Orestes confirm the sense that the Paedagogus' τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἐν τάχει βουλευτέον is grounded only in their shared desire for vengeance and in the practical requirements of speed and efficiency in furthering this aim, not in any divine imperative or other external, moral standard.

At 339–40, Chrysothemis tells Electra, εἰ δ' ἐλευθέραν με δεῖ / ζῆν, τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ' ἀκουστέα ("If it's necessary that I live / free, there must be complete obedience to those who are in power"). She says this after admitting that her sister, not herself, is justified in her refusal "to be taught over a long time not to indulge vainly her fruitless passion" (κοὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ διδαχθῆναι θέλεις / θυμῷ ματαίῳ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι κενά . . . . καίτοι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐχ ᾗ 'γὼ λέγω, / ἀλλ' ᾗ σὺ κρίνεις, 330–31; 338–39). Here, δεῖ and ἀκουστέα seem to lend both objective and practical (physical) validity to Chrysothemis' otherwise morally unjustified obedience to "those who are in power." This objectivity, however, is undermined both by the conditional form of her statement ("*If* it's necessary . . .") and by the obvious subjectivity and self-concern of her "need" "to live free," in contrast to what she must consider Electra's slavery (cf. Electra's own words at 1192). Though most Greeks would consider the choice of "freedom" over "slavery" obvious and natural—that is, in line with an external, non-subjective social code of values—Chrysothemis' expression of this choice stands in sharp contrast to Electra's heroic refusal to live in this way. Jebb takes εἰ με . . . δεῖ ζῆν as simply equivalent to εἰ μέλλω ζῆν (referring to parallels at *OT* 1120 and *Trach.* 749),[15] but this ignores both the fundamental sense of δεῖ and the cumulative effect of its occurrence in the same sentence as the verbal adjective ἀκουστέα. Chrysothemis is represented as justifying her obedience by attributing it to some external necessity. Yet her use of ἀκουστέα and δεῖ cannot efface the impression she gives of being weak and

14. ἐνδίκου is an emendation by Lange, printed by H. Lloyd-Jones and N. Wilson in *Sophoclis Fabulae* (Oxford, 1990), 62. The manuscripts unanimously read ἐνδίκους, in which case the correct translation would be, "righteous slaughter of my hand." Cf. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, *Sophoclea: Studies on the Text of Sophocles* (Oxford, 1990), 44 (where the lemma should refer to v. 37, not 38).

15. R. C. Jebb, *Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments: Part VI, The Electra* (1894, reprint Amsterdam, 1962), 52 on 338ff.

selfish, if not in ordinary human terms, nevertheless in contrast to Electra's loyalty to her father's memory and strong resistance to authority.[16]

Later in the play, in another scene with Chrysothemis (and the Chorus), Electra herself employs a verbal adjective in her assertion that she will kill Aegisthus with her own hand, since her sister refuses to join her in this deed that would bring the two of them praise (976), universal recognition of their bravery in cult (981–82), and heroic glory while they live and after their deaths (985): ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρί μοι μόνῃ τε δραστέον / τοὔργον τόδ' ("But with my own hand and alone I must do this deed," 1019–20). Here too the moral necessity implicit in δραστέον is apparently external and objective, but actually internal and subjectively based. There is also, perhaps, a touch of the practical in αὐτόχειρί μοι μόνῃ τε δραστέον; unlike Chrysothemis, however, whose way of speaking seems to focus solely on practical, not moral concerns, Electra displays both "the heroic temper" and the moral commitment to the dictates of an "internalized other" that Knox and Williams, respectively, consider the defining feature of Sophoclean heroes. This "other" may be the father to whose memory she clings and whom she reveres throughout the play, or the idealized brother in whom (she believes) her hopes have been disappointed. In either case her loyalty is a moral imperative and not, like her sister's appeal to necessity, a reason for doing nothing.

The final verbal adjective in the play is spoken by Orestes just before the end, when he forces Aegisthus to precede him into the house where he is to be killed in the same place he slew Agamemnon (1495–96): σοὶ βαδιστέον πάρος ("You must go first," 1502). When Aegisthus replies mockingly, ἦ μὴ φύγω σε; ("So I don't escape you?"), Orestes responds, μὴ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἡδονὴν / θάνῃς· φυλάξαι δεῖ με τοῦτό σοι πικρόν ("So you don't die at your own pleasure; I need to see to it that this is bitter for you," 1503–4). Perhaps Orestes uses the verbal adjective here not only to objectify the need for Aegisthus to do as he says but to specify the practical necessity: you have to go first because that will ensure that what ought to happen (your deprivation of pleasure) can happen. It is less clear, however, why he does not say χρή rather than δεῖ. After all, the very next line begins with χρῆν, "it should have been," in what is virtually the apodosis of a contrary-to-fact condition: χρῆν δ' εὐθὺς εἶναι τήνδε τοῖς πᾶσιν δίκην, / ὅστις πέρα πράσσειν γε τῶν νόμων θέλοι, / κτείνειν· τὸ γὰρ πανοῦργον οὐκ ἂν ἦν πολύ ("It should have been that this justice quickly be for all: / whoever wishes to act beyond the laws—/ to kill him; for villainy would not abound," 1505–7). Presumably χρῆν indicates that this contrary-to-fact sentiment is Orestes' own (though one that he implicitly claims as a general truth), while the notion that Aegisthus must die where he killed Agamemnon and have no pleasure in his own death is marked as objectively valid and necessary. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Paedagogus' βουλευτέον near the beginning of the play,

16. One might compare the ordinary human weakness of Ismene in the Prologue of *Antigone*, in contrast to the extraordinary ethical and practical strength of her sister. Ismene's ἀλλ' ἐννοεῖν χρὴ τοῦτο μὲν γυναῖχ' ὅτι / ἔφυμεν, ὡς πρὸς ἄνδρας οὐ μαχούμενα ("We must bear this in mind, that we two [sc. herself and Antigone] were born / women, and so not about to fight against men," 61–62) is analogous in tone and effect to Chrysothemis' εἰ δ' ἐλευθέραν με δεῖ / ζῆν, τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ' ἀκουστέα ("If it's necessary that I live / free, there must be complete obedience to those in power," 339–40), though "we two were born women" is perhaps a less invidious formulation than "it's necessary that I live free."

the "must" expressed by βαδιστέον and δεῖ is really, as the subject accusative με suggests, based on Orestes' personal feelings and desires, as well as on the practical need to act in a certain way, not on any external, objective inevitability or necessity that δεῖ might seem to suggest. This confusion in regard to the moral basis of Orestes' vengeance—a vengeance achieved through the same kind of treachery and deceit used by Aegisthus and Clytemnestra in the murder of Agamemnon—seems a fitting conclusion to a problem play in which Orestes' deception and selfishness cause nearly as much harm to Electra as to his enemies; in which audiences' and readers' responses are wavering and divided throughout; and at the end of which they remain unsure of their moral bearings, hailing the accomplishment of just revenge even while regretting both the cost of this revenge to the hero and the dubious moral stature of the avenger.

The four verbal adjectives in *Philoctetes* similarly call attention to the play's moral problematic. The first of these is spoken by Odysseus in the Prologue, when he instructs Neoptolemus that he must not lie about his identity (τόδ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον, 57), just after telling him, "You must be noble in what you have come for" (δεῖ σ' ἐφ' οἷς ἐλήλυθας / γενναῖον εἶναι, 50–51) and, "You must steal away Philoctetes' mind and life, speaking with words" (τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ / ψυχὴν ὅπως λόγοισιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων, 53–54). This clustering of the language of "necessity" is a characteristic feature of the play, and here, as elsewhere, it gives rise to the question: *Why* is it "required" that Neoptolemus do or not do these things? The use of δεῖ and of the verbal adjective suggests an objective factor such as divine inevitability or some causal necessity, but Odysseus offers no such rationale—only that Neoptolemus is there to "obey and assist" him (ἔργον ἤδη σὸν τὰ λοίφ' ὑπηρετεῖν, 15; κλύῃς, ὑπουργεῖν, ὡς ὑπηρέτης πάρει, 53); that "the possession of victory is something pleasant to obtain" (ἡδὺ γάρ τι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν, 81); that he himself does not consider "falsehood" (τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν) "shameful" (αἰσχρόν), "if the falsehood brings salvation" (οὔκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναί γε τὸ ψεῦδος φέρει, 108–9). Perhaps Neoptolemus (and an audience or reader) is meant to understand that the need to serve the best interests of the Greek army is the moral basis of what Odysseus commands; perhaps, as many scholars have thought, there is an extra-dramatic allusion to what the audience knew was the actual end of the Trojan War, and so to a kind of historical or narrative necessity. In any event, Odysseus' failure to offer some reason why Neoptolemus must do as he says suggests that he has no good reason, other than his personal desire to be successful in his plot against Philoctetes and to achieve what he promised the army (cf. 615–19).[17] I would interpret the unusual, somewhat awkward syntax of 54–55 (ὅπως with the future indicative after δεῖ) as a sign of his difficulty in breaking the news to the noble son of Achilles that he "must" lie for no objective reason other than that a lie will succeed. The triple expression of necessity in ll. 50–57 is itself a sign of Odysseus' difficulty and at the same time part of his rhetorical strategy for overcoming it.

17. On Odysseus as an "amoral opportunist," see M. W. Blundell, "The Moral Character of Odysseus in *Philoctetes*," *GRBS* 28 (1987): 307–29, esp. 321.

Of course, what finally enables him to have his way, to seduce Neoptolemus into "taking Philoctetes by treachery" (δόλῳ Φιλοκτήτην λαβεῖν, 101; cf. 107), is his argument that Neoptolemus cannot win the glory of sacking Troy without the bow of Heracles that Philoctetes possesses. When he hears this, Neoptolemus gives way in l. 116, a line beginning with the play's second verbal adjective: θηρατέ' οὖν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἴπερ ὧδ' ἔχει ("They [sc. "the weapons"] would have to be hunted, if this is so"). This line is especially striking because, as I have noted, it includes apparently the only instance in any Greek author of γίγνομαι rather than εἰμί as the copula with the verbal adjective and also the only example in Sophocles of the verbal adjective with an optative form of the copula. This optative, in the apodosis of a mixed condition, shows Neoptolemus driven against his will to yield to Odysseus' seduction, much as interlocutors in Plato's dialogues are sometimes driven to agree with arguments of Socrates. Neoptolemus clings to the tentative form of a future less vivid (or "should-would") apodosis (θηρατέ' οὖν γίγνοιτ' ἄν . . .), as if reluctant to face squarely the consequences of what he must admit (in the indicative) is the reality of the situation Odysseus has just made clear to him (εἴπερ ὧδ' ἔχει). This reluctance would perhaps be reinforced, if Elmsley's emendation of the manuscripts' οὖν to ἄν is correct (θηρατέ' ⟨ἂν⟩ γίγνοιτ' ἄν . . .),[18] and it is certainly enhanced by the use of γίγνομαι rather than εἰμί, as if the need to hunt the bow were not yet fully real and established in his mind. The special effect of Neoptolemus' verbal adjective is further heightened by its emphatic position at the beginning of the line. None of the other thirty-three verbal adjectives in Sophoclean trimeters occurs in this position,[19] and only four others are located in the first colon of the line, before the caesura: *Ajax* 853 and 1250, *Antigone* 677, and *Trachiniae* 1204. θηρατέ[α] in *Philoctetes* 116, with its unparalleled verb, mood, and positioning, is much more arresting and emphatic than any other verbal adjective in Sophocles. It not only shows Neoptolemus' surrender to Odysseus' seduction, but its verb of hunting suggests his tacit adoption of Odysseus' way of speaking about Philoctetes as if he were not human, but some kind of animal with a lair rather than a human habitation (αὐλίου, 19; ἐναυλίζοντι, 33), which goes out to pasture for fodder rather than food (ἐπὶ φορβῆς, 43). Though Neoptolemus uses the word θηρατέ[α] of the bow, his choice of this metaphor, I suggest, comes from Odysseus' diction that figuratively reduces Philoctetes to a sub-human prey.

It is no accident that Neoptolemus associates his willingness to treat Philoctetes in this way with his "putting to one side all shame" (πᾶσαν αἰσχύνην ἀφείς, 120). He may think this shamelessness is associated only with his readiness to profit by lying, but as the play goes on it is clear that shame, like friendship and pity, is an essential part of what it is to be human and that this humanness is lacking in Odysseus. On the other hand,

18. Lloyd-Jones and Wilson follow Elmsley in their text and support this decision at *Sophoclea*, 181, referring to J. Diggle, *Studies on the Text of Euripides* (Oxford, 1981), 47 (on Eur. *HF* 93–97) and *PCPS*, n.s. 20 (1974): 6.

19. πειστέον at the beginning of *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1516, a trochaic tetrameter catalectic, is the only parallel.

although Neoptolemus can lie for what he considers his own advantage, in the end he cannot treat the all-too-human Philoctetes inhumanly, as a mere animal and a means to an end, without losing his own humanity. In Hesiodic terms (*Op.* 276–80), Neoptolemus chooses δίκη over a form of ἀλληλοφαγία, when he takes pity on Philoctetes as his father does on Priam in *Iliad* 24 (ἐμοὶ μὲν οἶκτος δεινὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ τις, 965; cf. 967). The ἀπορία he feels when this pity first takes hold (965, 974) is an early sign of the restored humanity that eventually leads him to return the bow he had "hunted" so successfully.

In response to Neoptolemus' ἀπορία, Odysseus enters unexpectedly at 974 with an abruptness strongly marked by ἀντιλαβή in that verse. Shortly afterwards he uses two verbal adjectives in consecutive lines of *stichomythia* with Philoctetes, in which he attempts to negate the effect of Neoptolemus' pity and to force Philoctetes to accompany them to Troy. Odysseus claims to act in Zeus' name. When Philoctetes accuses him of making the gods "false" (ψευδεῖς) by hiding behind them as an excuse for what he is doing (θεοὺς προτείνων τοὺς θεοὺς ψευδεῖς τίθης), Odysseus replies, "No, [I make them] true. The road must be traveled" (οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀληθεῖς. ἡ δ' ὁδὸς πορευτέα, 993). "I say, No!" (οὔ φημ'), continues Philoctetes. "But *I* say, Yes," responds Odysseus, "there must be obedience in this" (ἐγὼ δέ φημι. πειστέον τάδε, 994); a few lines later he adds, "You must take Troy and raze it to the ground by force" (Τροίαν σ' ἑλεῖν δεῖ καὶ κατασκάψαι βίᾳ, 998). Here again, the juxtaposed verbal adjectives and impersonal δεῖ should mean that there is some external, objective, morally compelling reason why Philoctetes must do as Odysseus says, for example, the will of the gods as expressed in the prophecy of Helenus, different versions of which have been given earlier in the play. Odysseus, however, makes no reference to this prophecy and gives no reason for his words. In fact, his emphatic ἐγὼ δέ φημι contradicts the notion that either divine inevitability or any other external cause is involved here. Philoctetes, like Neoptolemus in the Prologue, is to do as he says because he says to do it. The shift to "the road" as the subject of πορευτέα and to the impersonality of πειστέον and δεῖ is a rhetorical evasion on Odysseus' part, designed to screen from Philoctetes, from Neoptolemus, and perhaps even from himself his own moral responsibility for what he has done and is doing to his victim.[20] Actually, the only objective—though hardly external—consideration is that Odysseus has (or seems to have) the power to make Philoctetes do as he wishes, just as fifteen lines earlier he had threatened to have two sailors bring him by force (982–83). Still earlier in the same scene, Neoptolemus too had offered "necessity" as the reason why Philoctetes "must sail to Troy" (δεῖ γὰρ ἐς Τροίαν σε πλεῖν, 915); "a great compulsion controls these things" (πολλὴ κρατεῖ / τούτων ἀναγκή, 921–22). In these lines Neoptolemus is trying both to find a euphemistic way of saying that Philoctetes must do what he himself wants him to do, and to conceal from himself his own moral responsibility for his

20. Cf. Blundell, "Moral Character," 316–17, on Odysseus' use of δεῖ and other "[i]mpersonal language [that] provides a convenient way of expressing this kind of 'necessity' without having to spell out or take responsibility for any awkward implications."

words and actions. When he first experiences ἀπορία at how to proceed, after Philoctetes awakens from his pain-induced sleep, Neoptolemus seems to take such responsibility: he says, "I don't know which way I must turn my helpless speech" (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ χρὴ τἄπορον τρέπειν ἔπος, 897), where χρή implies a personal "need" on his part, and he asks, "O Zeus, what should I do? Should I be found bad a second time / hiding what I must not and speaking the most shameful of words?" (ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δράσω; δεύτερον ληφθῶ κακός, / κρύπτων θ' ἃ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ λέγων αἴσχιστ' ἐπῶν; 908–9). In these lines Neoptolemus' use of δεῖ is entirely appropriate, since he has invoked Zeus as the divine standard in terms of which he must do what is necessary. Within seven lines, however, his (psychological) defenses have reasserted themselves and, as I have mentioned, he is telling Philoctetes that he "must sail to Troy" (915) on the basis of no such moral standard.

Perhaps the most paradoxical instance of the language of necessity in the play occurs at 1049 in Odysseus' notorious statement of his fundamental amorality and opportunism: "Where there is need of such men, such a man am I" (οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτός εἰμ' ἐγώ). Here Odysseus uses δεῖ, which should connote some objective, impersonal inevitability or necessity to describe his subjective, shifting, relativistic nature—ready to do whatever is needed at any time in order to prevail. Because he does, in effect, prevail in the end through Heracles' *ex machina* intervention, Odysseus' subversion of the language of moral necessity also seems to prevail in the world of the play.

The only instance where such language might seem to resist subversion and to express divine inevitability and an external, objective causal necessity occurs when Neoptolemus is trying, one last time, to persuade Philoctetes to accompany him to Troy, promising he will be healed by the Asclepiadae and, with his own help, will sack the city with his bow and arrows. He tells him of "Helenus, best of seers, who says clearly / that these things must happen, and further, in addition to them, / that it is a necessity within the present summer / that Troy be utterly destroyed" (Ἕλενος ἀριστόμαντις, ὃς λέγει σαφῶς / ὡς δεῖ γενέσθαι ταῦτα· καὶ πρὸς τοῖσδ' ἔτι / ὡς ἔστ' ἀνάγκη τοῦ παρεστῶτος θέρους / Τροίαν ἁλῶναι πᾶσαν, 1338–41). This summary of Helenus' prophecy is not as convincing as it might seem to be, since there is no way of knowing whether he actually said what Neoptolemus reports. There is another version of Helenus' words by the Merchant at 610–13, which raises the question whether Philoctetes himself is needed or just his bow and arrows, as seems to be the case in the Prologue. In addition, there is no certain indication that Neoptolemus himself was present when Helenus spoke, since it is impossible to know where his lie to Philoctetes begins or ends; it also is unclear on what he would be basing his report of the prophecy, if he were not present. One of the most striking features of the play is precisely this impossibility of knowing the truth, or even whether truth can be said to exist in connection with the stories Odysseus and Neoptolemus tell and the assurances they give. An oracle or prophecy in Sophoclean tragedy should be truthful, but in *Philoctetes* even the gods and their mouthpieces are subject to suspicion or worse: "Where must I place these things, and where praise them" asks Philoctetes, "when

praising divine things I find the gods evil?" (ποῦ χρὴ τίθεσθαι ταῦτα, ποῦ δ' αἰνεῖν, ὅταν / τὰ θεῖ' ἐπαινῶν τοὺς θεοὺς εὕρω κακούς; 451–52).[21] The unreliability of the gods throughout the play, together with the elusive or ambiguous status of "truth," is one reason many readers have found the appearance of Heracles, the destiny he dispenses, and his apparent vindication of Odysseus so disturbing and problematic.[22]

I hope to have shown that an examination of verbal adjectives and other ways of expressing necessity in Sophoclean tragedy can lead to a better understanding of how ethical dispositions are represented in the plays. Sometimes, as Williams and Knox have shown, the use of the verbal adjective expresses a special kind of necessity, grounded in a sense of shame, that helps make the hero what he is morally and existentially. More often, however, verbal adjectives and other, mostly impersonal, ways of expressing necessity are employed by characters to evade responsibility for their own words and actions and to manipulate others. These ways of speaking provide an escape from, rather than an expression of, moral commitment, and suggest that for those characters, at least, there are no objective moral standards, human or divine, only their own wills to power and pleasure.

One meets similar characters in the pages of Thucydides, who, in their speeches, regularly invoke necessity, often in the form of human nature and its so-called laws, to justify their personal and political appetites.[23] Thus the Athenians defend their empire by claiming that it is only natural that the "strong rule where they can and the weak suffer what they must" (Thuc. 5.89, tr. Crawley). Odysseus of the *Philoctetes* would be perfectly at home in the late fifth-century Athens depicted by Thucydides, whose civic divinity he is actually made to invoke anachronistically in the final line of the Prologue: Νίκη τ' Ἀθάνα Πολιάς, ἣ σῴζει μ' ἀεί ("Victory Athena, goddess of the City, who always saves me," 134).[24] Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* also

21. Reading the manuscripts' ἐπαινῶν rather than Postgate's ἐπαθρῶν, which is printed by Lloyd-Jones and Wilson.

22. It is worth noting, as one of the anonymous readers for this journal pointed out, that Heracles' speech, in contrast to that of the other characters, "is quite devoid of modal terms. He primarily uses future indicatives, saying not what 'should/must' happen, but simply what Philoctetes and Neoptolemus 'will' do." Whether, as the anonymous reader suggests, this indicates "that Sophocles is shifting the action to a higher, unequivocal level, leaving behind the ambiguous necessities voiced by Odysseus and Neoptolemus," seems to me doubtful. For in this play the "higher level" is by no means "unequivocal." Clearly, though, these prophetic futures differ from the use of the future that Knox (above, p. 293, with n. 4) groups with the use of the verbal adjective as characteristic of the Sophoclean hero's "resolve to act."

23. Cf. M. Ostwald, *ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides* (Philadelphia, 1988).

24. E. Fraenkel, *Due seminari romani di Eduard Fraenkel: Aiace e Filottete di Sofocle* (Rome, 1977), 46–48, suggests, unpersuasively in my view, that 134 is spurious. For what it is worth, the line occurs in all MSS and is quoted by Eustathius at 758.44. The scholiast on *Philoctetes* 99 (*Scholia in Sophoclis Tragoedias Vetera*, ed. P. N. Papageorgius [Leipzig, 1888], 353) makes a connection between Odysseus' claim (*Phil.* 98–99) that "for mortals / the tongue, not actions, rules in all things" and the politics of late fifth-century Athens: διαβάλλει τοὺς καθ' ἑαυτὸν ῥήτορας ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς διὰ γλώσσης πάντα κατορθοῦντας ("The poet slanders the political leaders of his own time as accomplishing all things by speech"). Cf. Blundell, "Moral Character," 328–29; P. Rose, "Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the Teachings of the Sophists," *HSCP* 70 (1970), 49–103, esp. 80–95 (though Rose embeds his comments on specifically Athenian resonances in a general discussion of the Sophists and "contemporary society"); P. Vidal-Naquet, "Sophocles' *Philoctetes* and the Ephebeia," in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (New York, 1988), 161–79 and 452–64, esp. 171. [Vidal-Naquet's essay was originally published in French in *Annales E.S.C.* 26 (1971), 623–38, then in *Mythe et tragédie en grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1972), 159–84. The English version was first published when volume one of *Myth and Tragedy* appeared as *Tragedy and Myth in Ancient Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1981), 175–99.]

might be thought of as a citizen of just this polis. It is a striking feature of that dialogue that whenever he and Socrates debate most intensely how one should live life—by pursuing pleasure and power or by practicing justice—the text bristles with instances of verbal adjectives and other impersonal expressions of necessity and morality, especially in Socrates' emotionally urgent affirmations of justice and virtue.[25]

Such questions of necessity, moral commitment, and how to live life are at the heart of Sophoclean tragedy and are reflected everywhere in its dramaturgy, diction, and style. Verbal adjectives, δεῖ, and other ways of expressing necessity are a small but significant part of the language through which audiences and readers are challenged to achieve interpretive and ethical clarity in the face of complex and sometimes contradictory usage.[26]

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25. E.g., *Gorg.* 487c5, 488a5; 490c1–5; 499e2–500a6, c2–d4; 507c9–508c2 (with five verbal adjectives in 507d1–5, four verbal adjectives in 508a9–b7); 512a7–b2, e1–5; 527b1–c4 (with five verbal adjectives in b4–c2). Cf. P. Murray, *Plato on Poetry* (Cambridge, 1996), 135, commenting on παιδευτέον in *Republic* 377a1: "P[lato]'s [*sic;* I would say, "Socrates'"] use of the verbal adjective throughout this section (cf., e.g., a9, b11, c1, c5, 378b1, c8, d2, d5, e2) underlines the importance he attaches to the task in hand. Cf. 595c3." Murray might also have referred to 378b3 (λεκτέον). There are sixty-one instances of the verbal adjective between 376e2 and 398b9, often occurring in emphatic clusters of three to five within eight to ten lines of text.

26. Versions of this paper were presented orally at Emory University, Exeter University, New York University, and the Universities of Chicago, Minnesota, and Pittsburgh. I am grateful to those in attendance on these occasions for helpful comments and suggestions. I also would like to thank Carolyn Dewald, Nancy Felson, Mark Griffith, Bernard Williams, and the Editor of and two anonymous readers for this journal for constructive criticism of earlier drafts and for suggesting improvements. They are, of course, in no way responsible for whatever errors and shortcomings may remain.

APPENDIX: VERBAL ADJECTIVES IN SOPHOCLES (LL.-J. AND W.)

Ajax

470	Αι.	οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. πεῖρά τις ζητητέα
668	Αι.	ἄρχοντές εἰσιν, ὥσθ' ὑπεικτέον. τί μήν;
679	Αι.	ὅ τ' ἐχθρὸς ἡμῖν ἐς τοσόνδ' ἐχθαρτέος
690	Αι.	ἐγὼ γὰρ εἶμ' ἐκεῖσ' ὅποι πορευτέον
809	Τε.	οἴμοι, τί δράσω, τέκνον; οὐχ ἱδρυτέον.
853	Αι.	ἀλλ' ἀρκτέον τὸ πρᾶγμα σὺν τάχει τινί
1140	Με.	ἔν σοι φράσω· τόνδ' ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον
1250	Αγ.	ἀλλ' εἰρκτέον τάδ' ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ οἱ πλατεῖς

Electra

16	Πα.	Πυλάδη, τί χρὴ δρᾶν ἐν τάχει βουλευτέον
340	Χρ.	ζῆν, τῶν κρατούντων ἐστὶ πάντ' ἀκουστέα
1019	Ηλ.	ἀλλ' αὐτόχειρί μοι μόνῃ τε δραστέον
1502	Ορ.	ἀλλ' ἕρφ'. Αι. ὕφηγοῦ. Ορ. σοὶ βαδιστέον πάρος

Oedipus Tyrannus

408	Τε.	εἰ καὶ τυραννεῖς, ἐξισωτέον τὸ γοῦν
628	Κρ.	εἰ δὲ ξυνίης μηδέν; Οι. ἀρκτέον γ' ὅμως
1170	Οι.	κἄγωγ' ἀκούειν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἀκουστέον
1439	Κρ.	πρώτιστ' ἔχρῃζον ἐκμαθεῖν τί πρακτέον
1443	Κρ.	χρείας ἄμεινον ἐκμαθεῖν τί δραστέον
1516	Οι.	πειστέον, κεἰ μηδὲν ἡδύ. Κρ. πάντα γὰρ καιρῷ καλά

Antigone

272	Φυ.	πράξαιμεν. ἦν δ' ὁ μῦθος ὡς ἀνοιστέον
273	Φυ.	σοὶ τοὔργον εἴη τοῦτο κοὐχὶ κρυπτέον
310	Κρ.	ἵν' εἰδότες τὸ κέρδος ἔνθεν οἰστέον
524	Κρ.	κάτω νυν ἐλθοῦσ', εἰ φιλητέον, φίλει
677	Κρ.	οὕτως ἀμυντέ' ἐστὶ τοῖς κοσμουμένοις
678	Κρ.	κοὔτοι γυναικὸς οὐδαμῶς ἡσσητέα
1106	Κρ.	τὸ δρᾶν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐχὶ δυσμαχητέον

Trachiniae

688	Δη.	κἄδρων τοιαῦτα. νῦν δ', ὅτ' ἦν ἐργαστέον
1204	Ηρ.	ὁποῖα δραστέ' ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ μή, πατρὸς

Philoctetes

57	Οδ.	λέγειν, Ἀχιλλέως παῖς· τόδ' οὐχὶ κλεπτέον
116	Νε.	θηρατέ' ⟨ἂν⟩ γίγνοιτ' ἄν, εἴπερ ὧδ' ἔχει
993	Οδ.	οὔκ, ἀλλ' ἀληθεῖς. ἡ δ' ὁδὸς πορευτέα
994	Φι.	οὔ φημ'. Οδ. ἐγὼ δέ φημι. πειστέον τάδε

Oedipus Coloneus

883	Χο.	ἆρ' οὐχ ὕβρις τάδ'; Κρ. ὕβρις; ἀλλ' ἀνεκτέα
1180	Θη.	μή σοι πρόνοι' ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ φυλακτέα
1360	Οι.	οὐ κλαυτὰ δ' ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οἰστέα
1426	Πο.	χρῄζει γάρ· ἡμῖν δ' οὐχὶ συγχωρητέα;